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Abstract
Background: Relationships of power, responsibility and accountability between health systems actors are
considered central to health governance. Despite increasing attention to the role of accountability in health
governance a gap remains in understanding how local accountability relations function within the health system in
Central Asia. This study addresses this gap by exploring local health governance in two districts of Tajikistan using
principal-agent theory.
Methods: This comparative case study uses a qualitative research methodology, relying on key informant
interviews and focus group discussions with local stakeholders. Data analysis was guided by a framework that
conceptualises governance as a series of principal-agent relations between state actors, citizens and health
providers. Special attention is paid to voice, answerability and enforceability as crucial components of
accountability.
Results: The analysis has provided insight into the challenges to different components making up an effective
accountability relationship, such as an unclear mandate, the lack of channels for voice or insufficient resources to
carry out a mandate. The findings highlight the weak position of health providers and citizens towards state actors
and development agents in the under-resourced health system and authoritarian political context. Contestation
over resources among local government actors, and informal tools for answerability and enforceability were found
to play an important role in shaping actual accountability relations. These accountability relationships form a
complex institutional web in which agents are subject to various accountability demands. Particularly health
providers find themselves to be in this role, being held accountable by state actors, citizens and development
agencies. The latter were found to have established parallel principal-agent relationships with health providers
without much attention to the role of local state actors, or strengthening the short accountability route from
citizens to providers.
Conclusion: The study has provided insight into the complexity of local governance relations and constraints to
formal accountability processes. This has underlined the importance of informal accountability tools and the
political-economic context in shaping principal-agent relations. The study has served to demonstrate the use and
limitations of agency theory in health governance analysis, and points to the importance of entrenched positions of
power in local health systems.
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Background
Local health governance, and particularly accountability
towards citizens has been an object of study and debate
since the global health community shifted attention to
primary healthcare, and engaged with the good govern-
ance and decentralisation paradigms. Already the 1978
Alma-Ata declaration espoused people’s “right and duty
to participate individually and collectively in the plan-
ning and implementation of their health care” [1]. The
Bamako initiative operationalised the declaration by pro-
moting decentralisation of health service financing and
management and universal access to health [2]. Around
the same time the view that decentralisation of public
services, and good governance of these services, includ-
ing health was essential for their enhanced performance,
gained wider traction [3, 4].
Despite increasing attention and the development of
multiple analytical frameworks for health governance a
need remains to empirically test and validate existing
frameworks [5]. Relationships of power, responsibility
and accountability between health systems actors and
the institutions that shape this are considered central to
health governance. Yet, the functioning of local govern-
ance is often studied from the perspective of decentral-
isation or provider accountability towards communities
[6–8], while a gap remains in understanding how ac-
countability relations between the multitude of govern-
ance actors shape local health systems, particularly in
the former Soviet Union and Central Asia. Furthermore,
a need for a stronger consideration of the political and
contextual factors influencing accountability relations re-
mains [9].
This study aims to address this gap by offering an ana-
lysis of principal-agent linkages in the local health sys-
tem of two districts in Tajikistan. Health governance in
Tajikistan, or Central Asia in general, has received little
attention, and has mainly been focused at central level
reforms, such as the introduction of a Basic Benefit
Package of health services (BBP) and the role of inter-
national aid in this [10–15]. Fragmentation in health fi-
nancing regulations and stewardship functions coupled
with insufficient donor coordination, leading to a prolif-
eration of vertical and pilot programmes suggests the ex-
istence of a patchwork of different health governance
arrangements across the country [14]. Closer insight into
the way local stakeholders in the health system relate to
each other, and how the local context shapes these pat-
terns of power is therefore warranted. To analyse gov-
ernance relations at the local level in Tajikistan a triadic
principal-agent framework is used. This framework al-
lows for an exploration of principal-agent linkages be-
tween three sets of actors that are considered to form
the heart of health governance: government, providers
and citizens. Particular attention is paid to the core
components that have been identified to contribute to
accountability as a principal-agent relationship.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section out-
lines the methods used for this qualitative study, and an
elaboration on the choice and assumptions underlying
the principal-agent analytical framework of this paper.
The following section presents the main health system
actors in two distinct districts in Tajikistan and an ex-
ploration of their accountability relationships. The impli-
cations of the key findings are next discussed in light of
the wider literature on accountability and governance,
both in terms of the lessons from the Tajik experience
and the use of agency theory for health governance ana-
lysis. Lastly, the paper offers some concluding thoughts
on future entry points for policy, practice and research.
Methods
Study design and setting
The study design for this research is a comparison of
multiple, embedded case studies [16, 17], which has the
potential to explore a phenomenon in the context in
which it is embedded, particularly when the contexts is
integral component of the study, increasing explanatory
power and analytic generalizability compared to a single
case study design [18].
Field work was conducted in two districts: one of the
Districts of Republic Subordination (Rayoni Respublikans-
kogo Podcinenja or RRP in Russian), a region encompass-
ing the former Karotegin or Gharm Oblast (Region) in the
East and the Hisor valley in the West, and one district+ in
Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (Region), com-
monly abbreviated to GBAO. More detail on the political
and socioeconomic context of these study settings is pro-
vided in Table 1. The districts are not specifically named
to protect informants. Instead the districts will be denoted
as the RRP district and the GBAO district.
The districts were purposefully chosen for their differ-
ence in proximity and interest to the political centre
Dushanbe and the fact that the RRP district featured as
one of the pilot districts for the implementation of the
BBP reforms, while the GBAO district was excluded
from the BBP pilot at the time of research. A key elem-
ent of the reforms is the introduction of co-payments,
with the exemption of vulnerable social and disease
groups, which is intended to generate extra revenue [12,
14]. In addition, health service delivery in the two dis-
tricts was supported by two different external develop-
ment partners, as will be elaborated in the results
section, which was assumed to influence local account-
ability relations in distinct ways.
Data collection
This research was part of a wider power and influence
study of stakeholders in the health system of Tajikistan
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at central, district and village levels that took place be-
tween May 2010 and December 2011. It is based on pri-
mary data collected through key informant interviews
(KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) in the two
study settings between June and August 2011.
KIIs and FGDs were carried out in person and through
telephone/Skype and were conducted in Tajik, Russian
or English. A total of 23 KIIs were held in the RRP dis-
trict, and 17 KIIs in the GBAO district. In addition, 6
FGDs were held with villagers in the GBAO district, and
2 FGDs in the RRP district. An overview of respondents
is provided in Table 2. The study further draws on the
contextual insights gained from 31 KIIs conducted
among governmental, bilateral, multilateral and non-
governmental organizations, primarily at central level,
which were used for another study [14]. Participants for
KIIs were purposefully selected, focusing on those in-
volved in the regulation, supervision, financing and
provision of health services in the two districts. A snow-
ball technique was used by asking interviewees to sug-
gest the most relevant stakeholders in the local health
system. Health providers were mostly interviewed at the
health facilities where they worked. This allowed for vis-
ual capture of the conditions in which they operated and
observation of interactions with patients and co-workers.
As FGD participants were identified through the
main organisations implementing health service deliv-
ery programmes in the two districts a certain degree of
respondent bias is possible. The cases are therefore not
taken as a sample representing community views in the
district. Rather, each case is taken to provide insights
into the contextual factors, processes and mechanisms
underpinning actors’ interactions, which can be used
for middle range theory-building and further testing
[16, 18, 21].
Data analysis
A topic guide was used for interviews and FGDs, including
questions on the organization, financing and provision of
health services, as well as the main challenges and respon-
sibilities in these areas. Detailed notes were taken during
each interview by each interviewee and compared after-
wards on the same day, which allowed for triangulation
and the elaboration of more comprehensive field notes.
These notes were used for preliminary analysis during the
course of the research. This revealed emerging themes
and aided the refinement of interview questions in the
process to further explore these themes.
Data analysis, which took place shortly after conclusion
of the field work, was based on a framework approach
[22], guided by the model for analysing accountability pro-
cesses as principal-agent relationships between three main
health system actors that has been developed and refined
by Brinkerhoff and Bossert [23, 24] as an application of
agency theory to health systems research. This model al-
lows for an analysis of health system governance actors
and their relationships of power, responsibility and ac-
countability, based on an understanding of health govern-
ance as a process of principals delegating authority to
agents, as shaped by the formal and informal institutions
and behavioural patterns. Originating from new institu-
tional economics, agency theory essentially forces a lens
on the relationship between incentives and performance
[25], and the tensions between the interests of the princi-
pal and agents, allowing for the existence of multiple
agents in the state-policy implementation [26]. Brinkerhoff
and Bossert have distinguished between three main
groups of actors in their model for health governance: the
state, providers and citizens/clients that act as principals
and agents to each other in more or less effective ways. To
Table 1 Study Settings
The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonmous Region (GBAO) is the largest region
of Tajikistan in landmass but the smallest in population. It is dominated
by the Pamir mountains, known as ‘the roof of the world’, which have
contributed to the region’s historical isolation and the development of a
distinct regional identity [19] in linguistic, cultural and religious terms.
The majority of the population adheres to the Ismaili faith and speaks
one of the Eastern Iranian (Pamiri) languages as opposed to the Western
Iranian Tajik, with a Kyrgyz minority in the East of the region. Partly as a
result of this isolation, low population density and mountainous geog-
raphy, the region is less developed socioeconomically compared to the
central regions of Tajikistan. Most households rely on subsistence agri-
culture and remittances from migrated family members for their liveli-
hood. During Soviet times tens of thousands of Badakhshanis, also
denoted as Pamiris, were forcibly resettled to the cotton growing plains
in the southwestern Qurqontheppa south-region, while positions of au-
thority were mostly filled by non-Badakhsanis, which fostered local re-
sentment towards central authorities [20]. This marginalisation was part
of the reason for Pamiris to ally with Gharmi and other regional and
ideological groups against the government in Dushanbe and form the
United Tajik Opposition during the civil war (1992–1997). Given this his-
torical background, the geographical isolation and cultural distinction
from the rest of the country, the region remains more distant from the
political centre up to this day. However, key positions continue to be
filled through appointment from the centre, ensuring a degree of polit-
ical control.
The districts of republican subordination (usually denoted by its Russian
acronym RRP) are a collection of districts that are governed directly by
the central government. The area stretches horizontally across the
middle of the Republic of Tajikistan from the Hisor valley at the border
with Uzbekistan around 70 km west of the capital Dushanbe, to the
Rasht or Karotegin valley in the east, bordering Kyrgyzstan, hemmed in
by mountain ranges in the north and southeast. The region has
historically never been a unified territory. Rather, it encompasses
mountainous areas in the east that were strongholds of the United Tajik
Opposition (Karotegin / Gharm region), and more populous plains in the
west that have remained under firm control of the central
administration in nearby Dushanbe. The district that forms one of the
two study sites in this paper is located in the Hisor valley in the western
part of the RRP. Due to its proximity to Dushanbe, intensive cotton
production on the irrigated plains, and the presence of the largest
aluminium manufacturing plant in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s main
industrial asset, the area has been of vital interest to the political and
economic elite, receiving most of its capital investments. As an
expression of that the Hisor elite was closely allied with those from the
Khujand/Leninobod north and the Southern Kulobis that dominated the
government by the end of the Soviet period and throughout the civil
war in the 1990s [20].
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generate greater understanding of these relationships this
article firstly describes the local governance actors in the
two districts following the actor categories, and subse-
quently analyses each dyadic relationship in terms of sep-
arate dimensions of accountability, captured in the
questions. In terms of citizens’ relationships to the state or
providers three core elements, which together form the
principal –agent process of citizens’ accountability, will be
explored: voice, interpreted as ‘articulating an interest’
[27], answerability and enforceability [23, 28, 29]. These
core elements can in themselves be considered an aggre-
gate of five steps in any effective accountability process:
delegating a mandate (or voice focused at a task), provid-
ing resources, performing on the mandate, providing in-
formation and being monitored on the performance, and
enforcement of the mandate [30]. These five components
will be used to guide the analysis of the principal-agent re-
lationship between state and providers for a more detailed
understanding. From the findings a fourth actor category
was found to exercise significant power as a principal: de-
velopment agencies. Their role and relation to the other
actor categories is therefore discussed separately.
Results
Main actors in the local health system
The state
In both districts, formally the most important actors in
the health sector are state actors, i.e. the district hospital
director, who by definition also manages the most import-
ant health provider in the district, and the head of the dis-
trict financial department. Both in turn are selected and
appointed by the district chairman (Rayon Rais), who is
indirectly assigned to his or her post by the Presidential
administration in Dushanbe. Budget allocations to health
facilities follow from their joint decisions, based on how
much funding has been secured from the Ministry of Fi-
nance at the central level. Other important actors that sur-
faced from interviews were the primary healthcare (PHC)
manager, responsible for PHC in the district and the
district health team (for which the Russian portmanteau
RaZdrav/GorZdrav was commonly used), de jure respon-
sible for health planning and supervision in the district. In
both districts, as was reported to be not uncommon
around the country, the deputy hospital director was
appointed as PHC manager at the insistence of the hos-
pital director. This was alleged to foster a sense of loyalty
and obligation from PHC manager to hospital director. To
facilitate the distribution of funds to health facilities in the
mountainous area, municipal mayors in the GBAO district
have a responsibility in this, acting as a middle man, but
hold no further mandate. Local legislative councils, (Majli,
or assembly of people’s deputies), exist but although le-
gally endowed to approve budgets and policy, they were
not indicated by respondents, including council members
(referred to as deputat by respondents), to exercise any
meaningful authority over the financing or management
of local health services.
Although initiated to be fulfilling a central role, the pos-
ition of the district health team, whose members usually
consist of a chairman and an accountant, following ap-
pointment by the hospital director, was found to be re-
markably weak in both districts. Its authority vis-à-vis the
other state actors was found to be low, as its mandate is
only vaguely defined, overlapping with the roles of district
hospital manager and PHC manager, and it cannot lay
claim to its own operational budget. In both districts, dis-
trict health team representatives claimed to receive no
funding to carry out their monitoring, supervisory and
planning activities apart from a below-subsistence level
salary, which was confirmed by KII at central level. Dis-
trict health team staff indicated that this means that inde-
pendent travel for monitoring and oversight to rural
health facilities is impossible, and even a workspace or of-
fice equipment is not covered and up to them to negotiate
with the hospital director. Lastly, the district health team
does not have any authority on budget planning, which is
generally a process of negotiation between PHC manager,
hospital director and the rayon’s financial department.
Table 2 Overview of KIIs and FGDs
District Method Type of interviewees / participants Number of KIIs / FGDs Total
RRP district KIIs District and municipal level government actors 5 KIIs = 23 FGDs = 2
Health providers 10
Development agency 6
Community groups / community leaders 2
FGDs Citizens 2
GBAO district KIIs District and municipal level government actors 5 KIIs = 17 FGDs = 6
Health providers 4
Development agency 5
Community groups / community leaders 3
FGDs Citizens 6
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This combined picture illustrates how the district health
team’s role as a coordinating body balancing the needs of
primary and specialized health care is undermined. Re-
ports from health staff and administrators in both districts
suggest rivalry between the district health team, PHC and
hospital managers over mandates between the different
rayon level administration officers. One example that sur-
faced during interviews with district officials and health
staff in the RRP district, was a dispute over the manage-
ment of ambulances. The PHC manager, hospital director
and the district health team all laid claim to this role that
was traditionally reserved for the hospital director. In sep-
arate interviews the different parties covertly expressed
that the other actors were merely interested in this man-
agement role as it provided a toll position, i.e. the fee pa-
tients pay for the service is creamed off by those who
manage the ambulance staff.
Providers
The most important health providers in both districts
are the district hospital, including its policlinic, and the
PHC centres: rural health centres and health houses.
The district hospitals also contain a chemist. All facilities
are publicly owned and receive most of their highly lim-
ited income from public sources, although formal user
charges for diagnostic tests and pharmaceuticals exist.
There were no formal private providers of care in either
district at the time of research, and no informal care
providers were mentioned by respondents, which leads
to the assumption that private providers play no signifi-
cant role in health service provision. Health centres are
generally staffed with multiple personnel, including a
physician, and theoretically better equipped. Health
houses would typically be staffed by a nurse only, al-
though in practice the observed difference in terms of
equipment and infrastructure between the two types of
PHC centres was marginal, particularly in the RRP dis-
trict. A difference could be observed between the degree
to which health providers were equipped and the state
of infrastructure between the RRP and health providers
in the GBAO district were generally better equipped and
in a better infrastructural state. This is probably mainly
due to the large investments by the Aga Khan Develop-
ment Network (AKDN), as described in the sections de-
scribing the role of development agencies.
Citizens - users
The district citizens are considered the main users of the
health services in the two districts, although seasonal
workers from other districts might make up a small add-
itional group of users. No activity from formal patient
groups was found in the districts, but other associations
for collective action were found. Two types of relevant
organizations for collective action could be discerned:
NGO-induced community-based groups (as explained
below) and neighbourhood committees, or mahallas. Al-
though citizen respondents generally expressed closer
identification with their mahalla, the community-based
initiatives were the only groups that could be found to
be playing a meaningful role in exerting citizen influence
on the health sector, although this role is limited by the
restrictive political environment.
Development agencies
A fourth relevant actor category in the local governance
of health services emerged from the findings, given their
relative weight of their involvement in local health ser-
vices: external development agencies. In the RRP District
a Swiss Development Corporation funded project, pro-
ject Sino, was operational, and in the GBAO district the
Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) through the
Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS) and the Mountain
Societies Development Support Programme (MSDSP)
provided extensive support. In both cases this support
included the rehabilitation of health centres, provision of
equipment, awareness-raising activities for citizens
around health issues, health staff training, technical sup-
port for health facility management and limited monthly
health worker salary supplementations (officially termed
incentive payments). In addition, the AKDN had insti-
tuted a revolving drug fund and community based health
funds (micro-insurance) through their own community-
based organisations, the Village Organisations (VOs).
Principal-agent relationships between the main actors
This section elaborates on the principal-agent relations
between the main actors that establishes the process of
local health governance in the two districts.
State –providers
Health providers in the two districts are all state-owned,
receive most of their budget from the district’s alloca-
tions and its employees are civil servants. Formally, the
district’s hospital director, PHC manager and the district
health team practice regulatory oversight and supervi-
sion over the health providers. The district health team’s
lack of means to exercise oversight means the hospital
and policlinic directors, i.e. the hospital director and
PHC manager, practice oversight over their own man-
agement. The lack of separation between funding, pur-
chasing, regulation and provision functions that flows
from the diverse functions of hospital directors and PHC
managers observed in the two districts and the resultant
blurring of the principal-agent relationship between state
and providers, appears to benefit the district hospital
and policlinics over rural PHC facilities.
In terms of a mandate, a BBP defines the formal scope
of services provided in the public facilities, with
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commensurate co-payment rates. In practice the degree
to which this mandate could be performed upon was
found to be limited by a severe lack of financial re-
sources, impacting equipment, drugs and skills short-
ages, albeit to uneven extents.
Although formally 40% of health funding is reserved
for PHC in the two districts, the budget is so small that
staff from rural health centres and health houses
reported neglect by district authorities in terms of fund-
ing at the expense of the district’s hospitals and policli-
nics, which was confirmed by visual observation.
Budget allocations follow a line-itemised input logic
without flexibility to shift funds between budget lines in
case of changing needs or priorities. In practice 80 to
90% of allocated funds for rural PHC centres is used to
pay for salaries that are below subsistence level1 [31]. In
the RRP district the use of co-payment revenue,
generated under the BBP regulations, was a source of
contention. Because BBP co-payments were limited to
diagnostic tests and ambulatory surgery for district resi-
dents in PHC, the extra resources these user fees gener-
ate were limited. The PHC manager gave the example of
an ECG device that could be acquired for the polyclinic
after saving up the resources for three months. Rural
health facility staff on the other hand consistently com-
plained they saw very little to nothing back of the co-
payment revenue that they channelled to the PHC man-
ager on a monthly basis. This could be confirmed when
analysing the available information on collected co-
payments. As was shown in the PHC financial records,
the monthly revenue varied from 0 to 150 TJS per rural
health facility, with the district capital’s polyclinic gen-
erating over 500 TJS monthly. Due to the budgetary
split between PHC and hospital care there was no com-
pensation through monies from co-payments in hos-
pital care, where revenues were much greater. One of
the other effects of the low level of funding is that al-
though doctors have been trained to operate various
types of medical equipment they reported that they lose
those skills because the equipment is not available. This
effect was however much more widely reported in the
RRP district, due to the greater lack of equipment and
general lack of running water or constant electricity
supply in the PHC centres, which is necessary to run or
maintain the technology.
In terms of provision of information on, monitoring
and enforcement of performance, rural health workers
from both districts showed extensive paperwork for
record-keeping of client visits, but claimed supervisory
visits were erratic and, when conducted, largely punitive
in character, focused on opportunities for rent-seeking.
In the GBAO district rural health workers claimed that
the district financial authorities or the mayors only come
for inspection with the purpose of checking new equip-
ment given by the AKHS, and demanding a share of
revenue, even though formally co-payments are not
charged at rural health centre level. When supervisory
visits were undertaken by district authorities, rural
health centre staff from two health centres reported
sanctions they experienced as extortionate (twice a
nurse’s monthly wage) for missing equipment, which
they claimed to be the result of underfunding from the
same district authorities. District authorities claimed lack
of funds for transport hampered the conduct of regular
supervisory visits, and confirmed applying fines in case
of ‘wrongdoing’.
Citizens – providers
Health providers in the two districts were found to be
strongly positioned towards those seeking care, as public
providers hold monopolies in care provision and citizens
have little capacity to judge the necessity or quality of
clinical practices. In addition, particularly in the GBAO
district, health centres are sparsely distributed across a
highly mountainous landscape, leaving communities
with few other options than their local rural health
centre or health house. Although the relationship be-
tween providers and citizens is marked by great power
asymmetry, which applies to some degree to all health
systems, a clear difference could be observed in relation
to local primary health care providers versus the district
hospital and policlinic. Respondents from FGDs and in-
terviews with village representatives in both districts re-
ported relatively higher appreciation for services
delivered by their local PHC centre or health house,
compared to the district policlinic and hospital, where
informal payments were reported to be rife and experi-
enced to be at extortionate levels. In both cases no for-
mal direct voice mechanisms or institutions between
citizens and providers, such as report cards, or village
health teams were found or reported on. However, vil-
lagers expressed much greater trust in the staff of rural
health centres and showed understanding for their
underfunded position. Health staff in rural health cen-
tres and health houses were more perceived as ‘one of
them’, particularly in the GBAO district. As opposed to
the informal cash payments in the district policlinics and
hospitals, village residents in the GBAO district reported
giving products from their plots, such as potatoes, to
rural health facility staff as gratitude payments, and in
some cases lending a hand in small repairs to the clinic’s
building in recognition of the lack of resources these
health facilities reportedly receive from the district au-
thorities. Although an element of extortion by health
1Between TJS 200 for a nurse and TJS 400 for a head doctor according
to their own reports. At the time of research TJS10 = EUR 1.49, GBP
1.29, and US$ 2.12
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providers in demanding these in-kind payments from
patients cannot be ruled out, it appeared that these
contributions also formed an informal tool of enforce-
ability and contributed to a greater sense of answerabil-
ity by rural health centres and houses towards citizens
as compared to the district hospital and policlinic.
State – citizens
KIIs and FGDs with village residents and representatives
suggest the relationship between local district govern-
ment and the district’s inhabitants, who can be assumed
to all be potential users of the health system, is marked
by low trust and negligible citizen participation in
decision-making. Voice is limited by the lack of an elect-
oral process for key positions in local government and
the Soviet legacy of authoritarian leadership. The only
participatory governance structure that citizens per-
ceived to play a functional role in their lives is the
mahalla, or neighbourhood council. In the absence of ef-
fective formal channels of citizen participation, the
mahallas and AKDN’s community-based organisations
in some cases function as a channel to voice needs and
concerns towards and mobilise citizens collectively pool
or provide resources for healthcare provision or finan-
cing, as documented elsewhere [32].
The position of development agencies
Although omitted from the triadic health accountabil-
ity model, development agencies were found to play
an influential and distinct role in local health govern-
ance. Through their in-kind contributions to local
service delivery and health workers, as well as their
community activities they occupy a central position
towards health providers and citizens. As a bilaterally
funded project and a private, faith-based international
non-governmental organisation the most significant
development actors in the project cannot be consid-
ered local civil society or groups of direct citizen rep-
resentation (conforming to the category of ‘citizens’).
They therefore merit separate consideration.
AKDN’s presence in the GBAO district is in part moti-
vated by the presence of a predominantly Ismaili popula-
tion in the region, for whom the Aga Khan is their main
spiritual leader. Combined with their continuous pres-
ence since the years of severe food insecurity and con-
flict in the mid 1990s, and the wide range of other
activities it employs in rural, economic and cultural de-
velopment this lends the organisation a basic level of
cultural-religious legitimacy for people in the region. As
a channel and platform for community-based support
MSDSP set up VOs across GBAO, and later also else-
where in the country. Although they can serve to chan-
nel people’s concerns to the MSDSP, VOs hold no
serious leverage to demand answerability from it.
Project Sino’s intervention in the RRP district started
in 2004 with tuberculosis control work and soon after
broadened its scope to strengthening primary healthcare
and public health sensitisation among communities [33].
In other words, community-based groups were not en-
couraged to function as platforms for citizen’s voices vis-
à-vis either providers or state authorities.
Both project Sino’s and AKDN’s interaction with local
(health) authorities takes place through regular meetings
(in case of AKDN involving either AKHS or the MSDSP
depending on the issue), at which local authorities are
consulted on local needs in the health sector and they
are informed of the projects progress and new initiatives.
Similar to project Sino’s involvement with local health
authorities this process is merely consultative or inform-
ative in character, as other accountability dimensions
were found to be weak or non-existent. No financial re-
sources were reportedly being provided directly to local
government actors, they were not found to be active par-
ticipants in AKDN or Sino activities, and no specific per-
formance agreement or reporting obligation between the
two actors was found.
The engagement between AKDN and Project Sino
with health providers on the other hand bears strong
features of a principal-agent relationship. The resources
(monetary, in-kind and through capacity-building) pro-
vided by the both agencies are directly linked to the gen-
eral objective and mandate to strengthen primary
healthcare and reward health workers, and their use is
monitored in relation to provider performance. How-
ever, the large dependence of health facilities on this
support, implies the external actors have come to com-
pete with the state authorities as their most important
principal. This was perceived more strongly in the case
of the AKDN in GBAO, where even the interviewed
mayors and district administrators considered the
AKDN to have partly replaced the state in its role of
providing basic services. The consensus was that al-
though basic salaries of health staff are paid by the state
the AKHS provides most of the public health campaigns,
infrastructure maintenance, retraining of staff, and sup-
ply of medicines and technology. One top-level official
of the GBAO district even went so far as to call health
staff ‘volunteers’ since they perform their duties for a
below subsistence-level wage.
Discussion
This study has provided an understanding of the na-
ture of principal-agent relationships in the local health
sector of two districts in Tajikistan and their under-
lying power dynamics. Beyond that the findings from
the two settings can serve to yield insight into the
complexity of accountability relations and the way the
different components in the process of accountability
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can relate to each other. The application of agency the-
ory to two cases in this study has also served to high-
light its use and limitations. These insights will be
discussed and elucidated below in the context of study
findings from other settings and relevant conceptual
tools and theory.
Despite their different socio-economic, historical and
political contexts the qualitative data suggests that in
both districts relationships between key governance ac-
tors are fraught with generally similar constraints on ac-
countability for equitable and quality service provision
as proposed in the triadic accountability model. This
however does not exclude the existence of accountability
relationships with a different nature. In the face of weak
or absent formal accountability mechanisms it appeared
that informal interpersonal and inter-organisational be-
haviours play an important role in establishing an ac-
countability relationship, which confirms theoretical
reflections in the field of (health) governance and ac-
countability [23, 34–36]. These formal and informal ac-
countability relationships form a complex institutional
web in which agents sometimes also act as principals
and vice versa. Particularly health providers, as street-
level bureaucrats [37], find themselves to be in this role,
being held accountable “from bottom-up, top-down as
well as sideways” [38] as they face (sometimes conflict-
ing) demands from state actors, citizens and develop-
ment agencies.
In the relationship between health providers and state
actors the findings suggest accountability for the deliv-
ery of the BBP is limited by insufficient resources to
carry out this mandate, a rigid resource allocation ra-
tionale that is de-coupled from population needs or
provider performance and monitoring activities that ap-
pear more aimed at finding faults in record-keeping
and opportunities for resource-extraction through fines
and (informal) co-payment revenue than at support for
service delivery. This rent-seeking behaviour, which
was reported in both districts irrespective of the co-
payments associated with the BBP pilot, is in line with
patterns in the wider bureaucracy as documented in a
related study [14]. It is important to recognise that the
negative, punitive character of this supervision style
was found to be an important factor in health staff
demotivation and attrition elsewhere and stands in con-
trast to the more supportive or coaching supervision
approach by managers, which has been identified as a
strong motivator for health workers in a broad variety
of low and middle income settings [39–43]. The lack of
decision space, limited resources and capacity to exer-
cise effective accountability has also been found to be
critical in other rural low resource settings [44, 45]. Its
combination with a bureaucratically-engrained rent-
seeking rationale, which turns monitoring and
supervision into a power tool to incentivise the agents
(health providers) to serve in the principal’s interest,
particularly skews internal accountability away from
provider performance, as has been documented exten-
sively in India as well [46].
According to Hirschman [27] voice is one of the two
important ways, together with exit, in which people re-
spond to inadequate services. By extension Paul [47]
considered them the two main factors that influence ac-
countability. The findings of this study suggest that ac-
countability between state authorities and citizens in the
two districts is hampered by a disaffection among citi-
zens with the severely limited opportunities for them to
express their voice and the lack of effective formal en-
forceability mechanisms accessible to a wider public, i.e.
a strong local legislative power that is chosen through
free and fair elections. The lack of voice towards govern-
ment actors resulting from a lack of belief in the possi-
bility of answerability in Tajikistan corroborates findings
from elsewhere in GBAO [48] and also echoes findings
from other settings with recent experiences of authori-
tarian government [49]. This could also be a factor in
explaining the lack of ‘rude accountability’ [50], found in
this study. The instrumental use of threats through
shaming or violence as a mechanism for frontline nego-
tiations by citizens towards service providers, constitut-
ing this ‘rude accountability’, appears to be going hand
in hand with a greater awareness of rights and rising ex-
pectations on social service provision in Bangladesh,
where this was found [50]. Tajikistan markedly contrasts
with this setting, as expectations of what the state is able
or willing to deliver have massively reduced [51] and
bureaucratic and democratic legitimacy have signifi-
cantly eroded since the short-lived period of openness in
the Soviet Union’s last years [52].
Based on the recognition that the ‘long route of ac-
countability’ is often insufficient or ineffective in incenti-
vising services to be more responsive (international)
non-governmental organisations in comparable contexts
have over the past decade initiated social accountability
mechanism aimed at strengthening the ‘short route of
accountability’ between citizens and health providers [6,
8]. In the two districts of this study however, the primary
focus of the community-based organisations that have
been formed, particularly in the GBAO district, is not on
promoting active decision-making with state authorities.
The degree to which they can enforce providers to be
answerable appears to depend largely on ‘weak’ or
‘bridging’ social capital ties [53] that some community
representatives manage to establish or nurture to voice
their expectations and concerns [32], whilst information
asymmetry between providers and citizens hampers the
ability of the latter to do so. The in-kind ‘payments’ or
support provided to local rural health facilities, in the
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GBAO district particularly, can be interpreted as a token
in the creation of a social bond, or debt, with an obliga-
tion to reciprocate, as elaborated by Mauss and others
[54], or as a limited form of co-production [55]. As
Abimbola noted, this type of collective action by non-
state (community) actors to keep primary healthcare ser-
vices afloat can be found across LMICs, and can be seen
as an informal example of collective governance [56].
The lack of strong or formal channels for citizens to
voice their expectations or concerns around health ser-
vices is particularly significant given the severely limited
‘exit options’ for people, particularly the poor [57].
Widespread poverty, geographical isolation, bad road in-
frastructure and a lack of private healthcare provision in
addition to a limited network of public facilities contrib-
ute to this. The observation that both exit and voice op-
tions are severely limited can perhaps explain citizens’
efforts to contribute to the functioning of their local
health centres. In other words, the lack of exit and voice
options lock them in a type of continuing loyalty of
‘making do’ with the limited services that are available.
This is a hypothetical inversion of Hirschman’s theory
that high loyalty to a company, organisation or state
works to limit people’s voice and exit options [27].
A number of limitations to the application of the tri-
adic principal-agent model to the study of health sys-
tems of low-resource settings have surfaced in this
study. First of all, the triadic model does not take ac-
count of the influence of the main external development
agencies on citizens, providers and state authorities and
the relationships between them in such settings. The
findings from this study suggest the AKDN and project
SINO have mainly dealt directly with health providers,
establishing a principal-agent relationship parallel to that
between state actors and health providers. This fits a
pattern that donors in Tajikistan have mainly worked
directly with beneficiaries instead of trying this through
the government [58]. This pattern, although highly time-
bound and likely to evolve, is unlike other fragile settings
or areas of precarious statehood where external develop-
ment actors and local health authorities engage in an
unbalanced mutual dependency relationship [45] or net-
worked governance of the health sector [59] in an im-
perfect attempt to foster local ownership and systems
strengthening.
The cases explored in this study give insight into the
internal divisions, power asymmetries and varying or
sometimes competing interests, partly stemming from
the inherited Soviet Semashko health system. It shows
how complex practices of power and contestation over
resources within the bureaucracy are influential in shap-
ing policy implementation, mirroring the contestation
over resources among local governance actors in South
Africa [60]. The triadic model with its theoretically
homogenous actors categories does not serve to under-
stand these complex relations of power. Heterogeneity
and competition within the actors categories was par-
ticularly evident in the ‘state’ and ‘providers’ groups. The
competing interests of the Hospital Director, PHC man-
ager, district health team and the district financial depart-
ment revolved largely around access to and autonomy in
decision-making over the allocation of scarce funds. The
side-lining of the district health team in both districts,
which was facilitated by the elusive formal mandate of this
body and the double hat worn by the Hospital Director, as
head of the most important health provider in the district,
and key local government health official are the most
striking examples of this. These examples confirm that the
idea of holding a single agent category, such as ‘the state’,
to account can be problematic in practice, summed up as
‘the problem of many hands’ that have contributed to any
policy (outcome) [61].
Altogether these limitations throw up some funda-
mental question on the use of principal-agent theory for
analysing health governance. Not only are the relations
between actors more complex than suggested in the tri-
adic model, the uncovering of rent-seeking rationales
and co-production initiatives at community level suggest
a need for other concepts and tools to explore practices
of power, contestation and collaboration in local health
governance. The application of principal-agent theory to
governance has been criticised for ‘theoretically mischar-
acterising’ governance problems assuming the existence
of ‘principled principals’, who are willing to hold agents
to account whilst embodying the public interest, and the
emphasis on individual incentive calculations [62]. This
fails to recognise the implication of principals them-
selves in abuse of power for private gain, which is sug-
gested in this study, and the expectation of others to be
implicated in that. This influence of the (expected) be-
haviour of others on individual behaviour highlights the
collective, rather than individual nature of rent-seeking
and the importance of collective norms in perpetuating
behaviour that is irrational from the viewpoint of the
public good. Approaching governance as a collective ac-
tion phenomenon, centred around the question what
factors can help to overcome harmful equilibria of par-
ticularistic interests dominating in governance has there-
fore been seen as a more useful approach [63, 64].
Ultimately, however, the two approaches can also be
considered complementary, as Marquette and Peiffer
argue [65]. As this study shows, the application of
principal-agent theory in the study of local health gov-
ernance helps to unpack the incentives under which key
stakeholders in the system relate to each other. It has
provided insight into the challenges to the different com-
ponents making up an effective accountability relation-
ship, such as an unclear mandate, the lack of effective
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channels for voice or insufficient resources to carry out a
mandate. Future research could help to further explore
the phenomena found in this study, with attention to the
function and the role of norms in rent-seeking behaviour,
as well as the use of collective action theory to understand
the role of (mis)trust in governance relations.
Research limitations
This study has been subject to several limitations and its
results are time-bound to the period of field research.
Policy and organisational details have changed since data
collection, and will continue to change as lessons are
drawn, funding cycles change and new reforms are
piloted or implemented. The limitations in data collec-
tion pertain to the relatively short period in which data
collection took place, and the limited number of FGDs
with citizens. Future studies could rely more on longer-
term immersion and participant observation to better
flesh out the complexities of agent’s motivations, strat-
egies and practices of power. Respondent bias cannot be
ruled out as AKDN, SDC’s project Sino and WHO facili-
tated entry to the study settings, although their repre-
sentatives were excluded from interviews and FGDs with
other stakeholders. Together with the closed political
environment this may have biased respondents’ answers.
Some limitations pertain to the topic of inquiry itself.
Exploring power relations is sensitive in any setting, but
particularly in an authoritarian environment with a leg-
acy of large statist dominance of basic services, the econ-
omy and society [66] that has been penetrated by a more
patrimonial type of governance by central elites [52, 67].
This requires provisions in the presentation of results to
protect informants. Lastly, quantitative methods could
have helped to gather more representative views on the
daily practices of health workers and citizen’s voice.
Conclusions
This qualitative study has presented an analysis of health
governance at the district level in Tajikistan through an
exploration of the way in which the main health system
actors engage in a principal-agent relationship. In the
application of the principal-agent model of health gov-
ernance to district level Tajikistan, it has explored the
previously understudied area of local health governance
in post-Soviet Central Asia. This has highlighted the
weak position of health providers and citizens vis-à-vis
state actors and development agents and the prevalence
of parallel lines of accountability towards health pro-
viders from development agents next to those assumed
by the triadic accountability model. With consideration
for the political and economic context the study also re-
veals the contestation over resources and resultant
power play among local government actors and the ex-
istence of informal enforcement tools shaping de facto
accountability relations. It thereby also served to dem-
onstrate the limitations of this model in the study of
health governance. This encourages further reflection
on the complementarity of analytical concepts and tools
from power and collective action theory and their ap-
plication to the health system. More concretely, the
study shows that particular attention needs to be paid
to the importance of entrenched positions of power
when introducing a new governance structure such as a
district health team.
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